Abstract: This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power. Our main result is that households significantly increase their investment in land improvement due to such ties. A main explanation appears to be that connections to office holders strengthen de-facto land property rights. Our analysis also suggests that discrimination in favor of relatives leads to substantial efficiency losses. JEL: D73, H7, O12, Q15
Introduction

1
This paper investigates the effect of family ties between farmers and local government officials on investment in agricultural land improvements. The importance of agricultural investment for economic development is well recognized and has received increased attention in recent years, in part as a result of the 'food price crises ' in 2007 (e.g. de Janvry and Sadoulet 2008 . A number of papers have investigated the effects of land property rights on agricultural investment (e.g. Feder and Onchan 1987 , Besley 1995 , Alston, Libecap, and Schneider 1996 , Braselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 2002 , Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle 2002 , Carter and Olinto 2003 , Jacoby and Mansuri 2008 , Do and Iyer 2008 , Hornbeck 2010 . The literature on the political economy of local government in developing countries is also growing fast (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000 , Besley, Pande, and Rao 2007 , Ferraz and Finan 2008 . At the same time, few studies have brought these two strands of the literature together by studying the political economy of property rights and agricultural investment.
An important exception is the contribution by Goldstein and Udry (2008) . They investigated the effect of position in traditional, local power hierarchies on fallowing of agricultural land in the Akwapim region of Ghana. Fallow is a major type of investment and Goldstein and Udry show that farmers with traditional political office have stronger property rights than other farmers. They therefore fallow their land much longer than others. We aim to contribute to this literature and do so in a very different context, namely that of rural Vietnam.
Households may be connected with public officials in three different but not mutually exclusive ways. First, one or more household members may themselves be public officials. Second, a household may have relatives living outside the household who are public officials. Third, friends or other non-family relations of the household may be officials. Our data set contains information on the presence of public officials in each household and on whether household members have relatives or personal friends, who are officials. For methodological reasons, we focus on the effects of having relatives outside the household who are officials. This means that we mainly investigate government capture by the extended families of public officials. In other words, we study nepotism in local government. The reason for focusing on connections with relatives (rather than looking at the effects of officials in the household or connections with non-relatives) is potential endogeneity.
Whether a household member takes up work as a public official, and whether the household forms and reports connections with non-relatives in government, is simultaneously determined with our main outcome variable, agricultural investment. To illustrate, if a household has invested heavily in the introduction of a new, high-value crop, the incentives for household members to seek employment as officials may be lower than in other households. The returns from spending time on the farm are higher. A household planning to invest may actively nurture relationships with nonrelatives in government in order to obtain approval or assistance for the investment project. Also, households may report an official as a 'friend' exactly because he or she assisted the household with a project, rather than the other way around. Connections with relatives outside the household are arguably more exogenous. A household's investment decisions do little to affect the probability of relatives in other households taking up positions as officials. Clearly, unobserved family characteristics (entrepreneurial spirit, risk and time preferences, etc.) may affect investment as well as the probability of having a relative in the local government. These factors are taken into account through the introduction of household fixed effects in our regressions.
The economic importance of family networks in Vietnam is documented by the survey data used here (as well as by other sources). For example, for more than half of the plots rented out by households in our survey, the tenants are relatives of the landlord. More than 90 per cent of monetary transfers received by households from private sources are from relatives, and more than 70 per cent report relatives as the main source of emergency funding. The 2001 World Values Survey in Vietnam asked respondents about the importance of different 'life domains'. Some 82 per cent of respondents say that the family is 'very important', while 57 per cent regard 'work' as very important. Only 22 per cent rank 'friends' as very important (Dalton et al. 2002) . Arguably, the most important, cultural background for these findings is the enduring influence of Confucianism in Vietnamese society.
So, family ties are important, but are ties to relatives with public offices particularly important and do they matter for agricultural investment? There are several reasons to expect that ties to government officials should matter for investment in land improvements. First, the attractiveness of such investment depends on the security of land property rights. Local government often plays a critical role in determining the strength of land rights. Local officials issue property deeds, decide on land expropriation for infrastructure and other development projects, and implement land use regulation such as 'zoning' laws. Second, investment needs to be financed, and in areas where commercial, financial institutions are not well developed, local government often plays a key role in regulating access to credit. Third, agricultural investment is risky, even when land property rights are secure. New crops may fail or the price of output may drop. Investment is particularly risky when land markets are poorly developed because recovery of investment through sale or rental is prevented. Local governments often control important sources of insurance. Access to credit is one such source, others include access to public sector employment and government transfers.
A priori, it is not clear whether discrimination in favor of relatives leads to efficiency losses. This depends on the motivation of officials. One possibility is that favoritism is driven by a 'taste for discrimination', in the words of Gary Becker (1971) . In this case, the official attaches higher weight to the welfare of relatives than to others in his or her maximization problem. This type of behavior, which might be labeled 'true nepotism', generates inefficiencies relative to the goal of maximizing a welfare function that weights everybody equally. Another possibility is that officials are constrained by limited access to information and limited ability to enforce contracts. For example, administrators of a public lending scheme may not be perfectly informed about the ability and willingness of potential borrowers to repay loans. In this situation, officials may rely on family networks as a form of social capital. Officials may be better informed about the skills and honesty of relatives than of other people. They may also rely on informal ties for enforcement of contracts. In this case, targeting public resources to relatives of officials might be efficient, helping the official solve an agency problem.
We use household level panel data from the rural areas of 12 provinces in Vietnam and our key result is that households with connections increase their investment in land improvement. Ties with close relatives, particularly sisters or brothers of the household head or spouse, are more important than ties with more distant relatives. We also investigate three potential channels through which political/bureaucratic connections may affect investment: property rights, access to credit and access to transfers. Results suggest that connections are mainly important because they strengthen de-facto property rights to land. Family ties to officials also improve access to informal credit and to private transfers, but for these outcomes ties with distant relatives, such as cousins, are more important than ties with close relatives. In contrast, property rights to land are mainly strengthened by ties to close relatives, as in the case of investment. We conclude that the effect of connections on land-related investment is more likely to be mediated through property rights than through access to credit and transfers. We further investigate whether favoritism leads to inefficiency in the allocation of investment goods. In particular, the marginal products of two of the main types of landtied capital goods, namely irrigation facilities and perennial trees and bushes, are estimated. It appears that the marginal products of these goods are significantly lower for well-connected households than for other families. Assuming diminishing marginal returns, this suggests misallocation of resources in favor of the well connected.
Another interesting feature of our findings is that officials consistently prefer informal over formal channels of redistribution to relatives. Connections with public officials has no effect on the probability of holding a land title (a formal means of property rights protection) but does affect the probability of having land confiscated by the state. Connections have much stronger effect on access to informal than to formal credit, and a stronger effect on the receipt of private than on public transfers. Informal channels of redistribution are more difficult to monitor for those who may hold officials accountable for their conduct (local populations as well as higher levels of government) than formal channels. A preference for using informal channels of redistribution indicates in our assessment that officials seek to hide these transactions from their principals. This supports the view that favoritism is driven by a taste for discrimination, rather than concerns for efficiency.
The findings stress the significance of informal networks for economic behavior in developing economies. They also suggest the presence of a potential for faster economic development. If households without political or bureaucratic connections could obtain equally strong property rights as the well-connected households, agricultural investment would increase. As a result, rural economic growth would be stimulated.
In addition to the studies on agricultural investment and political economy already mentioned, our analysis is also related to a group of papers addressing the economic effects of political connections (e.g. Fisman 2001, Khwaja and Mian 2005) and to the literature investigating personal connections between managers and workers within organizations (e.g. Prendergast and Topel 1996, Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul 2009).
Section 2 presents background information on land and local government in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the data set and defines key variables, while Section 4 presents descriptive statistics.
Section 5 includes the core analysis of connections to officials and land-related investment. Section 6 investigates the effects of political/bureaucratic connections on land property rights, and Section 7 analyzes the effects on access to credit. Section 8 focuses on the relationship between connections and access to transfers, while Section 9 investigates whether favoritism leads to efficiency losses. Section 10 concludes.
Background
Vietnamese agriculture is dominated by small, owner-operated farms. Rentals account for only about five per cent of agricultural land in our sample, and collective farms play a very minor role. proper land titles. Ravallion and van de Walle (2004 , 2008a show that (i) the process of decollectivization was largely equitable and efficient, (ii) subsequent land transactions worked to decrease the inefficiencies that arose from administrative land allocation, and (iii) recent increases in landlessness should be interpreted as a side-effect of economic development, rather than as a sign of poor groups being marginalized. Do and Iyer (2008) argue that the issuance of LURCs in the 1990s stimulated investment in perennial crops and increased time allocated to off-farm employment. Deininger and Jin (2008) Pingali and Xuan (1992) , steps had been taken in this direction as early as 1981.
3 For general treatments of land issues in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet (2006) , Brandt (2006) , Ravallion and van de Walle (2008b) , and Kirk and Nguyen (2009 control access to a number of public transfer programs targeted to the poor, the sick, the elderly or others. These transfers may be used to finance investment and also function to cushion households from the negative impact of investments that fail.
Direct evidence on the importance of informal connections between government officials and private agents in Vietnam that we seek to deepen here is provided by Appold and Phong (2001) .
They describe the functioning of such networks between government bureaucrats and firm managers. Gillespie (2002) argues that 'personalism', as opposed to merit-based systems of recruitment and promotion, is the key mode of operation in Vietnamese party and government hierarchies. Similarly, Gainsborough (2007) argues that patronage distribution plays a central role in the functioning of the Communist Party. The entrenched nature of political patronage in Vietnam is also discussed in Abrami, Malesky, and Zheng (2008) .
Data set, estimation model, and key variables
We make use of a household panel data set collected in the Vietnam Access to Resources Household The primary hypothesis tested here is that family connections with public officials lead to increased levels of land-related investment, and we consider regressions of the type:
where I ht is the real value of land-related investment undertaken by household h in period t, C ht is one or more indicators for having a personal connection to a local government official, and X ht is a vector of potentially time-varying household characteristics. v h represents unobserved, fixed household characteristics. The error term ε ht captures measurement error in the value of investment and unobserved, time-varying household characteristics. Conditional on X ht and v h , ε ht is assumed to be uncorrelated with C ht . As pointed out in Section 1, this assumption is more likely to be valid when C ht is a measure of having a relative in government than when the variable also includes connections to non-relatives. Accordingly, we focus on connections with relatives only.
The secondary hypotheses tested are that connections with investment affect property rights, access to credit and access to transfers. To test these hypotheses, we replace I ht in equation (1) with measures of property and access to credit and transfers.
We have data on four different types of land-related investment, including investments in soil and water conservation, perennial crops, structures for aquaculture (mainly ponds) and other structures, such as farm buildings, fences or animal sheds. For each type of investment data was collected on cash spending as well as household labor input during the past year. Household labor is valued by the average wage rate in the province for an unskilled, agricultural laborer, calculated from the wage and employment data available in the survey. The total value of investment is calculated as the value of cash spending and labor inputs in all four types of investment.
To measure personal connections to officials, respondents were asked whether any of their ( whether they belong to the husband's or the wife's side of the family).
Descriptive statistics
( Table 1 about 
Connections and investment
As is evident from Table 1 , the investment variables are quite heavily censored. In each year, less than half of all households report any land-related investment. To take account of censoring and also include household fixed effects in the regressions, we use one of the semi-parametric estimators proposed in Honoré (1992) . We refer to the Honoré estimator as a 'fixed effects tobit'.
To implement the familiar log-linear version of equation (1) Second, we argued above that connections with relatives outside the household can be largely viewed as exogenous. However, there is one channel through which a household can actively seek to obtain relatives in influential positions, namely through marriages.
6 Third, we expect the level of land-related investment to depend on the amount of land operated by the household and on the number of working age household members available to contribute labor to investment projects. At the same time, households with large landholdings and many members may find it easier to forge connections with officials. Therefore, we control for the amount of agricultural land operated by the household and for the number of household members between 15
and 64 years of age. Both variables are in logs. For similar reasons we also control for the age, At the same time, a marriage may increase the incentives to invest. For example, labor-saving investment may be required if a young person leaves the household to get married. To take account of this possibility, an indicator for any household members having married in the last 12 months is included.
schooling and gender of the household head. For the age variable, we add a squared term to take account of possible non-monotonous effects of age.
Fourth, a year-indicator is included to take account of changes over time in the economic environment. Random effects models include province indicators.
Finally we reiterate the importance of including household fixed effects. A number of difficult-toobserve household characteristics, such as entrepreneurial spirit, cognitive abilities and risk preferences are likely to affect both investment decisions and the probability that relatives are officials and therefore give rise to concerns about endogeneity. Household fixed effects largely account for these factors. Table 2 shows the result of our regressions for total investment. The first regression is a random effects tobit, while regressions 2 to 5 are based on the fixed effects tobit estimator discussed above.
The instrumental variables model in regression 6 is discussed in Section 7. The first two regressions include indicators for having a relative with a public office. Both models show a strong and statistically significant, positive effect of family ties with a public official on land-related investment.
The effect is somewhat smaller in the fixed effects than in the random effects models, as would be predicted if unobserved, fixed household characteristics affect both investment and connections in the same direction.
( Table 2 about The finding of a positive effect of relatives with public office on land-related investment is our main result. In Table 3 , the robustness of this result is tested. The dependent variable is total investment and fixed effects are included throughout, so the regressions in Table 3 are all permutations of regression 2 in Table 2 .
( Table 3 about here)
First, in the presence of imperfect credit markets, investment may depend on household income, because retained earnings are a main source of financing investment. At the same time, households with high incomes may be able to use their financial resources to help relatives obtain government positions. Indeed, Table 1 shows that households with connections do have somewhat higher income than other households. The reason for not including income in the preferred specification is that it may be endogenous. A main, potential purpose of investment is to generate higher levels of income. On the other hand, investment in the current period may also lead to lower earnings in this period, even if it raises income in the future. Perennial crops typically do not yield any harvest until a few years after planting. Regression 1 in Table 3 ignores these concerns and includes a measure of real household income, in logs. This variable enters significantly, but with a negative sign. The coefficient on connections to officials is still significant and changes very little as a result of this exercise. If a measure of income from other sources than agriculture is included, in order to reduce the effect of reverse causality from investment to income, results are quite similar, although the coefficient on income becomes insignificant (not shown).
A second, related concern is the effect of off-farm activities, in particular wage-labor. Connections may often be generated through work relations, either because household members work for the government or because they are employed privately by government officials. At the same time, wage work may induce investment, for example because it increases the opportunity cost of household labor and therefore increases the incentive for investing in labor saving technologies.
Again, the reason for not including measures of wage-work in the preferred specification is potential endogeneity. Regression 2 in Table 3 Third, the investment variable is highly skewed. While the logarithmic transformation goes a long way towards reducing the influence of high outliers, it is nevertheless prudent to check the effect of excluding extremely high observations from the estimation sample. Regression 3 excludes observations more than three standard deviations above the mean on the investment measure.
Again, the estimated coefficient on relatives with public office remains positive and significant.
Fourth, a drawback of the fixed effect tobit estimator is that cluster-robust standard errors cannot be calculated. While the household fixed effects probably remove the most important source of intra-cluster autocorrelation, it is interesting to estimate models where clustered standard errors can be calculated. Also, it is necessary to check the robustness of results to different choices of functional form. Regressions 4 and 5 in Table 3 report results from a linear fixed effects model for total investment and a conditional logit model for undertaking any investment, respectively. Both regressions include cluster-robust standard errors and in both cases the effects of relatives in government are positive and significant.
In sum, our results strongly support the thesis that family ties to public officials lead to increased levels of land-related investment. In what follows, we investigate which channels of causation bring about these results.
Land property rights
A key channel through which connections to officials may affect investment is property rights. ( Table 4 about here)
Control variables in Table 4 are generally the same as in Table 2 . However, in the regression for share of land with LURCs, we include the log of farm land owned, rather than operated. Households do not hold LURCs for land they rent.
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For the share of land held with a LURC, linear regressions are used. Results are similar if we use logit models for having any land with a LURC or for having LURCs for more than half of the area owned. In the models for being expelled by the state, we use random effects and conditional (fixed effect) logit models. Results are similar if tobit models for the amount of land expropriated are used instead (results not shown).
In the regressions for having lost land to the state, we include the amount of land owned including the land which was expropriated. For example, if concerns about equality of the land ownership distribution play a role in state land expropriation decisions, then initial land holdings are the relevant factor to consider.
Our results show that family ties to officials have no effect on the share of land held with a LURC.
This is true in the random as well as the fixed effects models used. This indicates that even if officials demand bribes for issuing certificates (World Bank 2009, Anderson and Davidsen 2011), they do not discriminate in favor of family members.
The regressions for being expelled by the state paint a different picture. In the random effects model the effect of having a relative with public office is negative but not significant. In the fixed effect models a strong and statistically significant, negative effect of family connections to officials appears. Having a relative with a public office is associated with a sizeable drop in the risk of having land expropriated. Regression 5 distinguishes between connections to respectively close and distant relatives. Mirroring the results on determinants of investment in Table 2 , the effect of connections with close relatives is numerically high and significant, while the effect of connections with cousins and other more distant relatives is weaker and not statistically significant. This strengthens the view that the effect of connections on investment is mediated through informal, or de facto, property rights. Since only households with variation on the dependent variable are included in the conditional logit regressions, and most households did not experience expropriations in either year, there is not enough data to further disaggregate the close relatives into parents, siblings and children as in Table 2 . In sum, the findings indicate that while formal land rights are not strongly affected by personal connections to public officials, de facto property rights are strengthened by having such ties. This may explain why connections lead to increased investment.
This interpretation relies on the assumption that de-facto property rights insecurity is an important determinant of land-related investment. The fixed effects instrumental variables regression reported in column 6 in Table 2 includes predicted values of the risk of land expropriation in a model for total investment. Land expropriation by the state is instrumented by the indicator for having a close relative in government. As explained in Besley (1995) and Braselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) , the need to instrument property rights in models for land-related investment stems from the possibility of a reverse link from investment to rights. Results show that the risk of expropriation is indeed a strong determinant of investment. 
Credit
Of course, a close relative in government is only a valid instrument for property rights if connections with close relatives only affect investment via the effect on property rights. This is at odds with the discussion above, which suggested that connections may also affect investment through other channels (e.g. access to credit and transfers).
However, the results presented in subsequent sections support the view that close relatives in government do not in fact have a strong effect on factors affecting investment, apart from the effect on property rights.
Another possible explanation for the investment differential between well-connected households and others is variation in access to credit. Local officials play an important role in the allocation of loans from state-run lending institutions. Also, connections to officials may improve access to informal loans, either because farmers can borrow money directly from officials, or because officials facilitate connections to lenders or act as guarantors for a loan. If it is well known in the local community who is connected with whom, and connections with officials improve a household's earnings-potential, then having a connection should improve credit-worthiness assessments. Table 1 shows that in 2010, 37 per cent of households had an outstanding formal loan and 17 per cent had an informal loan. Table 5 presents regressions for currently having a loan with, respectively, 8 Although the functional form makes it difficult to interpret point estimates, the estimated coefficient on the risk of expropriation may appear unreasonably large. One potential explanation is upward bias due to weak instrumentation (cf. Stock and Yogo 2005) . The first-stage F-statistic for the instrument is only 6.5. However, note also that the standard deviation on the predicted risk measure is only .038. So, a one standard deviation increase in the risk of expropriation is predicted to lead to a drop of .038*28.75 = 1.09 in ln(I + k) -ln(k), similar to the effect, for example, of having a relative in government.
formal and informal lenders. The set of control variables is similar to the set used in Table 2 . Owned farm land is used instead of operated land. Only owned land can be used as collateral.
( Table 5 about here) Random and fixed effects logit models for having a loan are presented. Results are similar if tobit models for the amount borrowed are used (not shown). The results indicate that family connections to officials are positively associated with having formal as well as informal loans. However, the effect of connections is not significant in the regressions for having a formal loan. In the models for having an informal loan, on the other hand, relatives with public offices have a much stronger and statistically significant effect in random as well as in fixed effects models. Regression 5 and 6 distinguish between connections to close and distant relatives. Contrary to the findings reported in Tables 2 and 4 , results show that in terms of access to credit, connections with cousins and other more distant relatives are more important than connections with close relatives. Only the effect of connections with distant relatives is significant and the point estimate is more than four times higher than for close relatives.
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These results suggest that access to credit, especially from informal lenders, is improved by connections with government officials. However, the finding that different categories of relatives matter for investment (close relatives) and for access to credit (cousins and other more distant relations) suggest that the effect of connections on investment is not mediated through availability of credit.
Another interesting result emerging from Table 5 is the strong, positive effect of group membership on use of credit. The likely explanation is that mass organizations play an important role in screening potential borrowers. To obtain approval from commune authorities to borrow from VSPB or VBARD, a letter of recommendation or similar is often required from the Women's Union, Farmers' Union or another mass organization.
Transfers
One reason why connections with close relatives are not important for access to credit may be that close relatives help each other through gifts, or transfers, rather than loans. Local government officials control access to a number of public transfers and are better able to afford private transfers 9 The result that networks are important for access to informal credit mirrors the findings in McMillan and Woodruff (1999) who studied the influence of inter-firm networks on Vietnamese firms' access to credit. than others. Potentially, government officials help their relatives finance investment through transfers. Also, transfers may function as a post-hoc insurance device, in case an investment project fails. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that transfers between relatives play a key role in mitigating the effects of shocks in the Northern Philippines. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that 46 percent of households report receiving at least one public transfer in the last year, while 56 percent report at least one private transfer. Well-connected households are three percentage points more likely to receive public transfers and 10 percentage points more likely to obtain private transfers.
The regressions in Table 6 analyze the determinants of receiving public and private transfers in more depth. Again, measures of connections to officials and control variables are similar to those used in Table 2 . The first three regressions explore public transfers. The results show that family connections with officials generally have a positive but not statistically significant effect on the probability of receiving public transfers. This is true in random as well as in fixed effect models, and with aggregated as well as disaggregated measures of family connections. The last three regressions explain receipt of private transfers. Results of these analyses show a strong, positive and significant effect of having a relative with public office on the probability of receiving a transfer from private sources. However, regression 6 shows that this result is mainly driven by connections with distant relatives. This also holds when close relatives are aggregated into one category rather than being split up into parents, siblings and children (not shown). As in the case of access to credit, the fact that different categories of relatives are important for, respectively, access to transfers and land related investment indicates that the effect of connections on investment is not primarily mediated through monetary transfers.
( Table 6 about here)
The finding that close relatives in government do not have a significant effect on either access to credit or access to transfers, and therefore does not appear to affect investment through these channels, strengthens the case for using connections to close relatives as an instrument for property right, as in regression 6 in Table 2 (cf. the discussion in Section 7).
Results for control variables are also interesting. All variables measuring social capital have significant, positive effects on receipt of private transfers. Membership of formal groups also increases the likelihood of receiving public transfers. Again this probably reflects the important role of mass organizations in terms of screening applicants for public benefits. The fixed effects regressions show that the presence of relatives, who can offer financial assistance in case of an emergency, increases the likelihood of receiving public transfers. This shows that although connections with public officials do not have a significant effect, informal networks do play a role in the allocation of public transfers. Private transfers mostly benefit land poor households. The random effects regressions show that private as well as public transfers disproportionately go to households with younger household heads, perhaps reflecting the fact that the presence of young children triggers transfers. The random effects models also show that education of the household head has a positive effect on receipt of both public and private transfers.
Efficiency
The results presented so far indicate that households with a connection to a relative with public office significantly increase their levels of land-related investment, and that a main reason behind this effect is that well-connected households enjoy stronger property rights to land than others. It is difficult to describe the owners of land eligible for expropriation as 'agents' of the local government.
Therefore, the effect of connections on property rights seems unlikely to be a response to agency problems. This leaves preferences for discrimination as the more plausible explanation, which in turn suggests that the allocation of land-related investment is inefficient. We now turn to testing this proposition directly. We focus on the production of crops, the main activity of Vietnamese farmers.
Assume a Cobb-Douglass production function, written as:
where Y i is the value of crop output in household i, determined by G inputs, denoted by j. pc α is a province-specific constant. Parameters are allowed to vary according to whether households are connected to public officials (c=1) or not (c=0). The reason is that well connected families may differ from other families in terms of land characteristics, skills of household members, off-farm activities and access to markets, all of which potentially affects the responsiveness of crop revenue to inputs.
On the list of inputs we include land, household labor, a composite measure of all other variable inputs (fertilizer, seeds, pesticides etc.), a composite measure of agricultural assets not tied to the land (draft animals, ploughs, threshers, carts etc.), the amount of land irrigated and the amount of land with perennial crops. The last two variables capture the main land-related capital goods with relevance for crop production, namely irrigation infrastructure and perennial trees and bushes. In relation to crop production, the main effects of land-related investment are to improve access to irrigation and to increase the area with perennial crops, and the production function exhibits decreasing, marginal returns to each input. Efficient allocation of inputs requires that marginal returns to each input is equalized across farms. If returns are lower on farm A than on farm B, efficiency is increased by re-allocating resources from A to B.
The value of the marginal product (VMP) of input j in household i is given by:
Now, if households with a relative in the local government face a smaller probability of land expropriation (or a lower, effective price of land-related investment goods), then these families should extend their use of land-related capital goods further than other households.
10 Therefore, they should ceteris paribus experience lower, marginal returns to these goods. To estimate marginal returns, we implement the following empirical model separately for well-connected households and for other households:
To include inputs which are zero for some households, the approach recommended by Battese (1997) is adopted and lnQ ij is set to zero when Q ij is zero (the notation ln * ij Q indicates that lnQ ij was transformed this way). For the G-k inputs which are not used by all farmers (all other than land, labor and variable inputs) a dummy d ij is included, which indicates any use of the input. i u is the error term, allowed to be correlated across households in the same commune.
Estimated production functions are reported in Table 7 and these models are not estimated with household fixed effects. First, that land-related investment may affect crop revenue with some lag.
In particular, perennial crops typically yield only a few years after planting. Therefore, relying on within-household variation over a two-year period leads to severe, downward bias in the estimated effect of planting perennial crops. Second, because production functions are estimated separately for well-connected and other households, household fixed effects effectively means that the households, who change connections status between the survey years are dropped. These are exactly the households, who are used to identify the effects of connections reported above. The preferred estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to irrigation are obtained from random effects regressions (regressions 1 and 2). To take the lagged effect of planting perennial crops into account, estimates of elasticities with respect to perennial crops are obtained from cross-sectional regressions on 2010 data (regressions 3 and 4), using the 2008 values of land with perennial crops (that is, the perennial crops variable is lagged two years).
( Table 7 about here)
The estimated elasticities with respect to irrigation as well as perennial crops are substantially lower for well-connected households (regressions 2 and 4) than for other households (regressions 1 and 3). non-connected households and a loss of 142 dong in well-connected families (implying that, at the margin, these households would generate more crop-revenue by planting annual crops). This is consistent with the view that, relative to the efficient outcome, land-related investment is substantially skewed in favor of households with a relative in public office. Nepotism appears to generate large inefficiencies in the allocation of productive resources.
( Table 8 about here)
Conclusion
We have investigated the political economy of agricultural investment in rural communities in
Vietnam. The core finding is that family ties to local government officials lead households to significantly increase their levels of land-related investment, for example in perennial crops and in soil and water conservation. The main reason behind this effect is that connections with government officials strengthen de-facto land property rights. We also found that family connections with officials improve access to credit and transfers, but different kinds of family ties are important for credit and transfers than for land-related investment. In particular, having a brother or sister in an influential government job is what matters for property rights and investment. In contrast, access to credit and transfers is mainly affected by having a more distant relative, such as a cousin, in a public office. Favoritism leads to substantial misallocation of land related investment. In particular, the value of the marginal product of investment in irrigation and perennial crops is substantially lower for well-connected households than for others, suggesting that investment is skewed in favor of the well-connected. Our findings also indicate that officials have a preference for using informal rather than formal means of redistributing resources to relatives. The most obvious explanation is that officials are less likely to be held accountable by their principals for informal than for formal transactions. The main results hold in models with household fixed effects, so they are not caused by unobserved household characteristics which drive both investment decisions and the quality of social networks.
These results underline the economic importance of informal connections, particularly in environments where property rights institutions and markets for credit and insurance are not fully developed. Future research should aim at advancing our understanding of the motivations behind nepotistic behavior of local government officials. We believe that the effects of family ties to public officials identified here are at least to some extent based on a 'taste for discrimination' among officials. Therefore, measures to increase the accountability of local governments in Vietnam are called for. Stronger accountability would increase the probability that officials with strong, nepotistic preferences are replaced and therefore also force the officials' (derived) preference for discrimination down.
The literature on land reform in Vietnam has tended to paint a largely positive picture of the effects of reform and the role of local government in implementing it. We do not dispute these findings, but our results do indicate that elite capture and nepotism play important roles in the present day local political economy of land relations in Vietnam. One way to reconcile our findings with, for example, Ravallion and Van de Walle's conclusion that the process of de-collectivization was largely unaffected by corruption (Ravallion and Van de Walle 2004) , is to view the period of rapid and radical reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an exceptional epoch, where the zeal of local officials and the monitoring by the central government were unusually intense. Arguably, our data were collected in more 'normal' times. Honoré (1992) . The trimmed least squared estimator proposed by Honoré is used. Reg. 6 is a linear, fixed effects IV-regression. Land expropriation is instrumented by the indicator for having a close relative who is a public official. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: authors' calculations. Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. Households with officials are excluded. In regression 1, a few households with negative income or missing data on total income are excluded. Regression 4 is a linear fixed effects model and regression 5 is a conditional logit. In these models, standard errors are clustered by commune. In the logit model, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded, which explains the low number of observations in regression 5. The other regressions are household fixed effects tobit models, based on the estimator developed in Honoré (1992) . * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: authors' calculations. Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by commune, except in regression 3. Households with officials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random effects models. In the fixed effects (conditional) logit models, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explain the low numbers of observations in the last two regressions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: authors' calculations. Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by commune, except in regression 1 and 3. Households with officials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random effects models. In the fixed effects (conditional) logit models, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explain the low numbers of observations in these regressions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: authors' calculations. Note: Robust z statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by commune, except in regression 1 and 4. Households with officials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random effects models. In the fixed effects (conditional) logit models, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explain the low numbers of observations in these regressions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: authors' calculations. 
